Lueck 2002; Banerjee, Gertler, and Ghatak 2002; Duffy et al. 2003) . In fact, share contracts dominate tenancy arrangements in low-income areas, particularly in Asia, while fixed cash rental leasing dominates in Europe and North America (Otsuka et al. 1992; Anderson and Magleby 1997) . Specifically, Banerjee et al. (2002) show that for 1969-76 (i.e., before special land reforms fixed the landowner's share at an artificially low rate of 25%), 90% of tenancy land in West Bengal, India, was leased with a standard contract of 50 : 50 landowner-tenant crop shares. Lanjouw (1999) reports that for Palanpur, a village in Uttah Pradesh, India, 80% of leases had standard 50 : 50 crop-share contracts in 1983. 1 In contrast, cash rental contracting has grown in popularity over time in developed agriculture, especially in the United States. In 1988 and 1992, 65% of rented U.S. farmland was for cash and 30% was for shares (Anderson 1994; Anderson and Magleby 1997) .
2 For the Corn Belt, Lake States, and Northern Plains in 1988, 55% of farm leases were for cash. In the other regions of the country, cash rental leases were even more common, ranging up to 85% by region. In the Salinas Valley of California in 2003, an area where the land is fertile, irrigated, and used to produce multiple-cropped vegetables, roughly 90% of the land was rented for cash in 2003. This land is extremely highly valued, and, accordingly, the typical cash rental rate was far higher ($2,500 per acre) than cash rents in the Midwest. In Iowa, 73% of the leased farmland was for cash rent in 2003, although the choice between cash and share terms varied widely by local circumstances. For southwest Iowa, where rainfall is more variable and farmland is rolling and subject to severe erosion, 60% of the leased farmland was for a crop share in 2003, but in east central Iowa, where rainfall is less variable and the farmland is less subject to erosion, 83% of leased farmland was for cash. 3 Moreover, 94% of the crop-share leases in Iowa were for 50 : 50 sharing (Duffy et al. 2003 ). 4 The empirical literature has also noted that share contracts tend to be oral and informal (Allen and Lueck 2002) . Of the 24% that were rented for a crop share in 2003, only 44% had a written lease, while 62% of cash leases (where the landowner has less control) had written leases (Duffy et al. 2003) .
We begin by stressing these key stylized facts that emerge from the empirical land tenancy literature. Our purpose is to construct a coherent model that explains why a limited range of contracts are in use and their regional variation by circumstances. The stylized facts we suggest should be explained by a comprehensive tenure contract model:
1. Production is sufficiently stochastic that agents' efforts are impractically costly to monitor. 2. Contracts on effort are unenforceable by a third party; thus, performance must be voluntary. 3. Crop-share contracts are renewable and tend to be informal oral contracts. 4. Crop-share contracts persist in agriculture for countries at diverse stages of development. 5. Crop-share (cash) rent tends to dominate in developing (developed) agriculture. 6. Where crop-share tenancy is observed, the most common contract is 50 : 50 sharing.
Although recent theoretical literature on optimal tenancy contracting has accommodated a few of these stylized facts, such as points 1-3 (see Allen and Lueck 1999; Young and Burke 2001 ), a conceptual model has not been presented that comprehensively admits this complete set of stylized facts and yet explains why contracts tend to be limited to these two specific types. The studies that have attempted to explain the choice of cash versus share contracts have admitted only these two possible choices (Ackerberg and Botticini 2002) rather than explaining why only these two alternatives emerge empirically.
Other studies have focused on conformity to local practices but have not offered a comprehensive explanation for observed similarities and differences in contracts across disconnected regions (Young and Burke 2001) .
To accomplish this purpose, we employ modern agency theory to model contracting between principals (landowners) and agents (tenants). Although we develop a static model, we rely on results elsewhere that demonstrate the implications and clear advantages of repetition for renewable problems with hidden actions (moral hazard), unobservable and thus noncontractible effort (potential adverse selection), and the infeasibility of third-party enforcement. 5 For example, Milgrom and Roberts (1992, pp. 259-63) analyze the role of reputation in models of contract enforcement and reach the standard conclusion that contracts must be incentive compatible and meet voluntary participation constraints so that both parties to a contract have incentives to fulfill it. In this framework, the principal and agent know when the terms of a contract are met even though they cannot be verified formally by a third party such as a court (Holmstrom 1989; MacLeod 2003; Serfes 2003) . A Nash equilibrium is reached when neither party can gain from making a unilateral deviation from the prescribed or expected behavior.
In the most general versions of the standard agency model, for example, Grossman and Hart (1983) , Kim (1995) , or Bolton and Harris (2001) , simple agency contracts for an applied analysis of the trade-off between effort incentives and risk sharing are difficult to generate. Alternatively, we apply the more common and now classic model offered by Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) and Holmstrom (1989) . 6 Their model considers linear incentives, which are robust to gaming strategies, as well as the implications of contract renewability. 7 This model generates optimal contracts consisting of two parts: a fixed "guarantee" payment plus an incentive rate that is a share of the principal's payoff. These contracts have two attractive features: (i) optimal contracts are linear in measured payoff and (ii) the strength of incentive for effort is decreasing in payoff risk. With renewable contracts, both principals and agents have an incentive to follow through because neither wants to bear the social cost of a damaged reputation, which affects future ability to contract.
Our model is, however, somewhat more general than the models offered by Holmstrom (1989) , Allen and Lueck (1999) , Ackerberg and Botticini (2002), or Serfes (2003) . While they consider the heterogeneity of risk preferences among agents and riskiness of tasks contracted by principals, we also permit agents to be heterogeneous in productivity of effort, cost of effort, and reservation utility. Differences in productivity of effort may be related to human capital in the form of general education and experience (Huffman 1974 (Huffman , 2001 or experience with the landowner's particular land.
8 Principals (landowners) are also potentially risk averse and heterogeneous in risk preferences. 9 Our results show how each of these forms of heterogeneity on the part of both agents and landowners matters for optimally designed land tenure contracts. 10 We also show why share tenancy is a robust contract in a variety of economic environments, why share contracts tend to dominate in developing countries whereas cash rental contracts tend to dominate in developed countries, and why the standard share contract is likely to specify 50 : 50 landowner-tenant crop shares.
First, we selectively review the tenancy literature and provide a more detailed critique and justification of the assertions above. Second, we develop and apply a principal-agent model of tenancy arrangements. Third, we apply and generalize the principal-agent model to a theoretical and conceptual analysis of land tenancy to show how stylized facts can be explained. In the final section, we present conclusions.
A Selective Review of the Tenancy Literature
Much of the land tenancy literature has considered why landowners rent land for fixed amounts (whether stated in cash or units of the crop) versus a fixed share of the crop. A parallel question of why farm operators hire labor at a fixed hourly rate of pay versus a fixed piece rate has often been considered in tandem because the conceptual issues are similar (Alston and Higgs 1982; Eswaran and Kotwal 1985; Laffont and Matoussi 1995) . Share tenancy has been the dominant land tenure arrangement considered by development economists because sharecropping has tended to dominate land rental contracting in developing agriculture (Stiglitz 1974; Newberry and Stiglitz 1979; Otsuka et al. 1992; Lanjouw 1999; Ackerberg and Botticini 2002; Roumasset and Lee 2003) .
Much of the comparison of cash versus share tenancy arrangements focuses on efficiency implications for the organization of agriculture. Marshall (1890) argued that share tenancy causes inefficient resource allocation because the tenant receives only a fraction of his marginal product as marginal revenue, which weakens the effort incentive. The resulting underemployment of effort was viewed as causing a relative overuse of land. D. Gale Johnson (1950) argued that this classical view of crop-share contracts focused too much on excessive depletion of soil nutrients or soil degradation and not enough on the role of the amount of land rented. He showed that, if monitoring an agent's work effort is costless and the tenant's share is a linear function of the tenant's labor per unit of land, then the landowner can increase the land rent share and cause the tenant to reduce the amount of land rented. In his view, this could mitigate the overemployment of land. Cheung (1969) later argued that if the tenant's work effort can be costlessly observed and enforced by the landowner, resource allocation under share tenancy can be as efficient as with an owner-operator or with fixed (cash rent) leasing. He argued, however, that share tenancy and cash rent cannot coexist in a world with transactions costs and risk-averse tenants but, rather, that share tenancy would be chosen when the gain from risk sharing is greater than the loss from transaction costs compared with cash rental. Furthermore, he argued that share tenancy per se does not cause inefficiency. Rather, institutional restrictions on share tenancy, for example, on the sharing rate, make it inefficient-at least in China.
11 However, monitoring is typically not costless. Monitoring costs can be high in crop production because of randomness in weather, soil conditions, and other aspects of biological production, which thus prevent backing effort out of observed productivity. Stiglitz (1974) and Newberry and Stiglitz (1979) presented two of the first studies to apply principal-agent models to agricultural contracts. Assuming production is stochastic and the tenant's effort is costly to monitor, they consider the landowner as the principal who offers a rental contract to the tenant as an agent. With stochastic production, the tenant's effort cannot be monitored because it cannot be backed out of the resulting output, which makes it noncontractible. Their results show that a crop-share contract can be rationalized as an instrument to attain optimal sharing of payoff risk between the landowner and tenant while providing an adequate incentive for the agent's effort. Key assumptions in their model are that the agent is risk averse and the principal is risk neutral and that the principal offers only contracts that jointly maximize the principal's and tenant's welfare. This process eliminates bargaining cost, which is a potentially important transaction cost in contracting. Using land tenure arrangements for risk sharing is argued to be important in poor countries where insurance and credit are hard to obtain. Braverman and Stiglitz (1982) have further extended this work to the theory of the second best to argue that landowners should intervene in all imperfectly functioning markets in which tenants are active, for example, credit, insurance, and input markets.
In related empirical work, Laffont and Matoussi (1995) consider the choice of share tenancy versus cash rent versus fixed-wage labor in Tunisiaassuming family labor is unobservable. They explain the predominance of share tenancy compared with cash rent by emphasizing the importance of repetitive contracting, the costs of collecting fixed rental payments under moral hazard (default), and imperfections in input markets such as credit, bullock power, and technical know-how.
In contrast to the above celebrated works, Allen and Lueck (1992 , 1998 , 1999 and Prendergast (2002) have argued against the risk-sharing motive for contracts. Allen and Lueck argue that commodity, capital, and insurance markets are well developed in the United States, that is, all relevant contingency markets are present and better suited than land tenure contracts for transferring risk associated with production and marketing. Accordingly, they argue that risk sharing is unlikely to be a major motivation for landownertenant contracting in modern North American agriculture and instead assume that both landowners and tenants are risk neutral.
12 Alternatively, they argue that contracts and other patterns of ownership are chosen to mitigate transactions costs-a Coase-type argument.
13 They argue that "Mother Nature," or heterogeneous local geo-climatic conditions, which largely determine cropping patterns, are fundamental forces that shape the incentives and transactions costs that ultimately determine optimal agricultural organization. By choosing contracts to maximize joint landowner-tenant surplus net of transactions costs, they predict that cash rental is more likely than share rental when farmland value is low because overuse of land by the tenant, for example, excess nutrient or water use, is of less concern to the owner then when farmland value is high.
For North American agriculture, Allen and Lueck further argue that relationship-specific assets (specialized land, skilled labor, buildings, and equipment) are unusual and that reputation effects in rural communities are real because communities are relatively small and stable. Thus, they explain the tendency toward oral or simple written contracts versus formal contracts as a "common law" that has developed in small and stable social environments. Thus, social customs in contracting become a type of social capital. On this basis, Allen and Lueck predict that optimal tenant shares will be higher when inputs are not shared between the landowner and tenant than when inputs are shared, and that, as the costs of land attributes increase or as land exploitation becomes more costly, the chosen contract will more likely represent a sharing of both inputs and output than output sharing alone or cash rental alone. These arguments are similar to those concerned with asset value when control is transferred via a contractual relationship. Using samples of individual land contracts, they find considerable support for these implications of their contract theory, although presumably similar implications would apply if these features were added to a model with risk aversion as well. Incidentally, they also report that sharing rates in North America for field crops are largely 50 : 50 when the landowner bears some share of the variable costs, although shares are often 60 : 40 or 67 : 33 when the landowner does not share in variable costs (Allen and Lueck 2002, pp. 77-84) . Otsuka et al. (1992) and Hayami and Otsuka (1993) have undertaken major reviews and syntheses of the land-tenancy and labor-contracting literature with emphasis on Asia using primarily a principal-agent framework under verifiable contracts. However, they assume contracts are renewable and verifiable by a third party where all workers and prospective tenants are homogeneous, implying that all workers and tenants have the same ability and that technology and all land is homogeneous. In this environment, they show that reputation effects provide a sufficient incentive to follow through (not renege) on contracts and thus maintain the efficiency of crop-share contracts. They also report that "a major puzzle unexplained by existing contract theories is the stylized fact of share tenancy that output is almost universally shared between the tenant and landowner at a 50 : 50 ratio with no explicit fixed payments, despite obvious differences in the relative contributions of land and labor to agricultural production among different production environments and technologies" (Otsuka et al. 1992 (Otsuka et al. , p. 1969 .
As this brief literature review reveals, the typical tenancy literature has a variety of shortcomings. Most studies either (1) are based on unjustified assumptions of costless monitoring and enforceability, (2) depend on risk neutrality (or, equivalently, availability of perfect contingency markets), (3) fail to explain why share tenancy is prevalent in a wide range of economic environments, (4) cannot explain the dominance of share tenancy in some circumstances while cash rent dominates in others, (5) fail to provide an economic explanation for why informal oral contracts persist even in developed countries, and/or (6) fail to explain why a single sharing rate is common across diverse agricultural environments.
A Principal-Agent Model of Land Tenancy Arrangements
Agency theory had its humble beginnings in studies of agricultural and insurance contracting, focusing on the trade-off between incentives for effort and risk bearing (see, e.g., Holmstrom 1979; Mas-Collel, Whinston, and Green 1995) . But agency theory has advanced considerably over the past 2 decades. In the new agency theory, a principal is assumed to contract with an agent to undertake some effort where production is stochastic and the agent's effort is unobservable. In other words, while the outcome or payoff is observable to both the principal and agent, effort cannot be verified by a third party such as a court. Hence, contracts are necessarily informal (Holmstrom 1989; Dixit 2002) and, thus, may be oral.
14 Such contracts must be incentive compatible and meet voluntary participation constraints so that both an economically rational principal and agent are better off fulfilling their part of the contract than defaulting. When the principal has full information on agent characteristics, only contracts that agents will accept are offered in order to eliminate transactions costs associated with bargaining.
In this section, we develop such a model of land tenancy in agriculture in which the need for enforceability is avoided by considering implicit contracts between principals and agents that are incentive compatible and meet voluntary participation constraints. Because agricultural tenancy contracts are for fixed and typically renewable terms, such as a crop year, protection of reputation through contract fulfillment is important in retaining the ability to rent land in future periods. Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) have shown that, for long-term renewable contracting between a risk-neutral principal and a risk-averse agent, a linear incentive scheme, with a nonnegative guarantee and a nonnegative bonus rate based on the principal's outcome, is robust to small aberrations in the environ-ment and gaming by agents. In one extreme, the bonus rate is zero, in which case the principal fully insures the agent (the agent receives a fixed payment per unit time). But this is a weak incentive for effort and open to shirking, unless monitoring is feasible. At the other extreme, a bonus rate of one gives the agent full title to the marginal output, although, without a guarantee, it offers the agent no insurance against payoff risk. Between these two extremes, a higher bonus rate creates stronger incentives for the agent to exert effort but also imposes more risk on the agent, who is relatively disadvantaged by bearing it. For most problems, Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) and Holmstrom's (1989) model generates both a positive optimal guarantee and a positive bonus rate.
To develop such a model for land tenancy, suppose that the principal is an agricultural landowner and the agents are tenant farmers. The technology describing the ith agent's production, measured by output or net revenue on one unit of land, is assumed to be linear in effort, ability, and applicable stochastic shocks,
where y i is the output of the ith agent's production process, e i is the ith agent's effort, a i is a positive index of the ith agent's ability or productivity (see Huffman and Just 2000) , i is a zero-mean agent-specific random shock to the production process with variance j i 2 , and d is a zero-mean shock with variance j d 2 that is common across all agents contracting with a given landowner, for example, because of variability of production associated with the interaction of climate, soils, and pest infestations on the landowner's land.
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For simplicity, all shocks are assumed mutually uncorrelated, although more general assumptions could be easily accommodated with notational expense. The total number of agents is n, but an important special case is where so that each principal contracts with one agent. n p 1 Each agent has constant returns to scale and knows the effect of personal effort e i on expected output, , and the variance of output,
. The variance of each agent's output has two com-
ponents: the first due to agent-specific randomness ( i ) and the second due jointly to principal-specific randomness and other factors common among agents (d).
Following Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) , Holmstrom (1989) , Dixit (2002) , and Prendergast (2002) , suppose that the principal adopts a linear incentive scheme for rewarding agents,
where a i is an agent-specific "guarantee," which is unrelated to the agent's effort, ability, or output; and is the agent-specific incentive
rate representing a share of output. If a i is zero, then the agent's effort is rewarded purely by a share of the output, as in a crop-share contract where b i represents the share. If and a i is negative, then the agent makes a b p 1 i fixed payment to the principal and retains all output as with cash rent. But a jointly infinite continuum of other combinations of a i and b i can also be offered by the principal. For example, if b i is zero and a i is positive, the agent would be a fixed-compensation employee of the principal.
Given equations (1) and (2), the agent's compensation as a function of effort is Randomness in output results from w (e ) p a ϩ b a e ϩ b ϩ b d. 
portional to the square of the incentive rate (b i 2 ) and to the variance of output (q i 2 ), where q i 2 is agent-specific (q i 2 ) plus principal-specific and other (j d 2 ) variability.
A risk-averse agent is assumed to receive utility from compensation for effort but to require compensation for bearing output risk. Assuming a smooth second-order differentiable utility function with standard properties, a secondorder Taylor series expansion of utility around expected wealth yields a linear mean-variance approximation of expected utility (Just and Zilberman 1983) . In addition, each agent is assumed to incur a certain utility loss in providing effort, for example, in terms of forgone leisure. Assuming that this loss is purely quadratic in e i for simplicity, the ith agent's expected utility is represented by
where k i is an agent-specific cost parameter and F i is the local agent-specific absolute risk aversion coefficient ( ). 16 The first two terms in equation F x 0 i (3) represent the agent's expected compensation for effort, the third term reflects the cost of effort, and the fourth term is the component of compensation required by the agent for risk bearing.
Where the agent is offered a given contract represented by (a i , b i ), the optimal effort chosen by the agent is found by maximizing equation (3) with respect to e i . The associated first-order condition implies that * e p b a /k .
Hence, each agent's optimal effort is proportional to the agent's abilityproductivity (a i ) and incentive rate (b i ) but inversely proportional to the cost of effort (k i ). Substituting the optimal effort in equation (4) into equation (3) yields the agent's optimal expected utility associated with a given contract, * 2
where is an agent-specific productivity index and is an
agent-specific reflection of the agent's risk premium associated with a given principal.
Where a principal has sufficient land to rent to n agents, the principal's profit after compensating agents is
which is positively related to the each agent's ability-
productivity (a i ) and effort (e i ) but negatively related to each agent's guarantee (a i ). On considering agents' optimal effort choices in equation (4), the principal's expected profit is
and the principal's variance of profit is n n 2 2 2 2
( )
With incentive compatibility, the principal is assumed to choose agents' guarantees (a i ) and sharing rates (b i ), that is, the contracts represented by (a i , b i ), so as to maximize his expected profit subject to agents choosing effort to maximize their individual expected utilities. With the voluntary participation condition, the expected compensation offered by the principal to an agent is at least as large as the agent's reservation utility. Hence, the negotiating procedure is such that the principal offers a particular contract (a i , b i ) to agent i, and then the agent decides whether to accept or reject the contract. The agent accepts the contract if his certainty-equivalent utility under the contract is at least as large as his reservation utility (m i ).
17 Although an agent's reservation utility could be zero, it generally will be positive if the agent has productive alternative work opportunities.
We assume that the principal is also possibly risk averse with a linear mean-variance expected utility function approximated about the principal's expected wealth with local absolute risk aversion parameter . Hence, F x 0 0 using equations (6) and (7), the principal's certainty equivalent expected utility considering agents' optimal effort choices is
The principal maximizes this expected utility with respect to all a i 's and b i 's subject to each agent's reservation utility (or voluntary participation) constraint. Using the expression in equation (5), the constraints can be represented as * 2
Because the principal's expected utility is decreasing in each a i , the principal's optimal choices for the a i 's will be where the associated reservation utility constraints are binding (see Huffman and Just 2000) . Solving equation (9) with strict equality, the guarantee component of each contract thus satisfies
The guarantee is thus positively related to the agent's reservation utility (m i ) and risk premium (r i ) but inversely related to the agent's productivity index (p i ). In other words, agents with greater ability-productivity require a smaller guarantee to contract with a given principal. Substituting equation (10) into equation (8) and maximizing with respect to remaining contract parameters obtains first-order conditions
( 1 1 )
While these conditions can easily be expressed in matrix form and solved for an optimal vector of b's, the qualitative implications are best understood through some special cases. First, if only one agent contracts with a given principal as in the typical developed agricultural setting, then equation (11) reduces to a single equation that implies
, for all i, j), then equation (11) amounts to n identical equations that imply 
i 2
In each of equations (12)- (14), the optimal share represents a trade-off between the principal's and agent's risk aversions. The optimal share declines to zero as the agent's risk aversion increases without bound (i.e., ), while r r ϱ i the optimal share increases toward one as the principal's risk aversion increases without bound (i.e.,
) . Conversely and more interestingly, the optimal F r ϱ o share increases toward one as the agent's risk aversion declines toward zero, and the optimal share for a risk-averse agent decreases as the principal's risk aversion declines toward zero.
In the limit where the agent is risk neutral (12)- (14) give the full share of output to the agent 0), ( ) and no share to the principal. 18 In this case, equation (10) 
In other words, if the agent gets the full share of output, then the only benefit to the principal is a fixed payment made by the agent to the principal, which is positive and advantageous to the principal when , that is, when a ! 0 i . This result clearly justifies a scenario in which optimal farmland 0.5p 1 m i i rental contracts are fixed cash rental leases.
19 By contrast, in the limit where the agent is risk averse and the principal is risk neutral ( ), the optimal share in each of the cases in equations (14) becomes to the agent's productivity index ( p i ) and risk premium (r i ).
An Agency Theory Explanation of Stylized Facts regarding Land Tenancy
In this section, we show that stylized facts describing agricultural land tenancy are consistent with the land tenancy model of this article. First, consistent with predominant reality, landowner-tenant contracts are assumed renewable on satisfactory renegotiation, which makes the reputational effects of contract performance important. Second, the model considers the reality of stochastic production and accordingly does not impose unrealistic assumptions of costless monitoring or enforceability. Rather, contracts are based only on behavior that can be expected without monitoring or enforcement. Third, because contracts are limited to cases that satisfy incentive compatibility, and voluntary participation constraints, formal contracting is not necessary. Contracts that are mutually preferred under repetition are fulfilled. Assuming formal contracting incurs transaction costs, informal oral contracting is thus preferred.
20 Hence, the model provides a rationale for the persistence of informal land rental contracts in both developing and developed countries.
Finally, consider the consistency of contract choices implied by the model with the remaining stylized facts outlined at the beginning of this article. Because the model considers a wide variety of circumstances describing landowners and tenants, the implications can be compared with observed reality across the variety of conditions that exist in agriculture.
In some cases, this consideration requires investigation of market equilibrium conditions. In the model of Stiglitz (1974) and Holmstrom (1989) , all principals are homogeneous and all agents are homogeneous. Thus, equilibrium can be investigated trivially based on optimal incentive contracting between a representative principal and a representative agent. Alternatively, following Ackerberg and Botticini (2002) and Serfes (2003) , we assume that both principals and agents are heterogeneous. However, both of these studies model heterogeneity empirically assuming that all heterogeneity of agents results from risk preferences and all heterogeneity of principals results from the riskiness of the task that is contracted. Furthermore, Ackerberg and Botticini (2002) consider only the two typical contracts (cash vs. share rental) as alternative choices, assuming that all principals and agents are captive players with no alternatives. Serfes, however, considers a continuum of contracts.
In contrast, we consider a variety of forms of heterogeneity and the full range of contract parameters represented by combinations of guarantee and incentive share components in the Holmstrom-Milgrom framework. Additionally, we consider the equilibrium that occurs when the supply of potential agents is larger than required to meet all contracts offered by principals and when any excess supply of agents have opportunities to work as wage labor in a shadow labor market that is large (and thus exogenous) compared with the market for tenant farmers. The supply of rental land in a given geographic locality is assumed to derive from a finite pool of landowners fixed by the geographic specificity of land assets and an associated distribution of attributes described by risk preferences and land-related variances of landowner-specific shocks (included in j d ). The demand for rental farmland is from a pool of prospective tenants with a distribution of attributes described by ability, cost of effort, risk preferences, and reservation utility.
In developing country agriculture, these conditions correspond with the common phenomenon whereby peasant labor not required for local agriculture moves temporarily to cities. In developed agriculture, this excess supply of tenants is caused by the increasing scale of efficient farm size and consequent exodus of farmers from agriculture as farm size increases (Huffman and Evenson 2001) . To draw sharp results, we assume that the number of landowners in a given geographic region, for example, a peasant village or small farming community, is sufficiently small that each principal faces essentially the same distribution of attributes in the excess labor pool regardless of behavior by other principals. 21 Clearly, equilibrium in these circumstances will result in landowners contracting only with tenants who have high productivity (high ability relative to cost of effort) and low risk premiums (low risk aversion and agent risk), other things being equal.
Cash versus Share Rent
To see whether remaining stylized facts are predicted by the model, consider how the optimal contract represented by equations (13)- (16) depends on circumstances. In developing agriculture, tenants are typically landless and poor (Otsuka et al. 1992; Lanjouw 1999; Banerjee et al. 2002) . While the model of this article is developed with a local approximation of absolute risk aversion where utility is an expansion around expected wealth for each individual in each time period (see Just and Zilberman 1983) , absolute risk aversion is assumed to be decreasing in expected wealth. Thus, peasant tenants in developing agriculture would be more (probably far more) risk averse than wealthy landowners (see Ackerberg and Botticini 2002) . Furthermore, in developing countries, especially in Asia, plot sizes are very small, and thus landowners rent to many tenants. When a landowner has sufficient size to contract with many tenants, agent-specific production risk is spread among agents, which reduces the landowner's risk through diversification.
Greater risk aversion among tenants, less risk aversion by landowners, and spreading of risk (which has the same effect as lowering agent-specific risk on landowner choice) 22 all tend to reduce the optimal share toward the result in equation (15) Turning to the case of developed countries, landowners tend to be retired farmers, their widows, or absentee landowners (Rogers 1991; Duffy et al. 2003) . Such individuals tend to be in a conservative stage of life where they are more reluctant to be involved in farm management decisions or to bear production and marketing risk (Duffy et al. 2003) , whereas active farmers are accustomed to bearing the substantial risks of large-scale agriculture. Furthermore, under the assumption that more farmers are available than can be supported on the land held by landowners with each successive round of adjustment to changes in efficient farming scale, competition among agents creates an incentive for each principal to select agents with less risk aversion, other things being equal, and thereby reduce the efficiency loss associated with agent risk bearing in the principal's payoff. As a result, farmers with higher risk aversion are more likely to exit as efficient scale increases because they are unable to rent sufficient land to maintain an efficient farm size. In turn, exiting farmers tend to become landowners with what farmland they own, which contributes to making the pool of landowners more risk averse. As a result of this ongoing process, tenants in developed country agriculture tend to be less risk averse, whereas the landowners tend to be more risk averse.
In addition, landowners in developed agriculture tend to own contiguous tracts of cropland and to rent to a single tenant because their land is often obtained by retirement or inheritance from a farmer who no longer had a sufficient farm size to compete. As a result, the risk from sharecrop tenancy cannot be spread across tenants by landowners. In fact, tenants in developed agriculture often rent from several landowners to achieve efficient farm size because of the rapid increase in farm size over the past half century. For example, the 1997 Census of Agriculture reports that the United States had 2,124,000 farms, with about 489,000 renting some of the land they farm from 2,290,000 landowners (Heimlich 2003 ; U.S. Department of Agriculture, NASS 2003). Thus, on average, each farm that acquired some land by rental was renting land from about five landowners.
Low risk aversion among tenants, high risk aversion among landowners, and an inability to spread risk by landowners all tend to increase the optimal tenant share toward . Thus, the model explains the tendency toward * b p 1 i cash rental contracts in developed country agriculture and an increase in that tendency as the efficient farm size has increased.
Optimal Shares under Share Rent
While the results thus far explain why share contracts tend to occur in developing agriculture and cash contracts tend to occur in developed agriculture, a wide variety of contract terms are possible in the model depending on the risk aversion of landowners, the risk aversion of tenants, and the contributions of tenants' characteristics and landowner holdings to risk. It remains to show why incentive contracts likely do not include a guarantee when sharing occurs (i.e., why when ) and why sharing tends to be 50 : 50 when * *
sharing occurs (i.e., why if ). We present several arguments * *
that motivate these conclusions.
The Case of a Shadow Labor Market with a Risk-Neutral Landowner
First, consider a case consistent with the conditions of developed country agriculture. To explain why tenancy contracts may not include a guarantee when sharing occurs (i.e., why when ), it is useful to consider * *
further the agent's reservation utility and its role in equilibrium analysis. In reality, the agent's reservation utility is likely determined by alternative employment opportunities available to prospective tenants. A model explaining potential income from alternative employment can be constructed in many different ways, but a relatively simple model suffices for our purposes. Sup-pose that if a prospective tenant does not rent land, the only alternative is to work as wage labor in a shadow labor market where compensation is proportional to effort (e.g., effort may represent hours of labor). Specifically, suppose effort allocated to an alternative labor market by the ith agent is denoted by , where the exogenous and certain wage adjusted e i for agent-specific ability is and, thus, income from wage labor is . Ifã a e i i i the ith agent does not rent land, then the agent's expected utility following the model in equation (3) is for which expected
ii ii utility maximization implies with optimal expected utility * ẽ
where is an agent-specific index of
worker productivity in the labor market. This would represent the reservation utility m i in equation (9) for the case where equation (1) represents the joint net revenue of the tenant and landowner from farming. With this alternative, an agent will optimally allocate either all effort to farming and none to the labor market if or all * * 2( e p b a /k and e p 0) a ϩ 0.5b ( p Ϫ r ) 1 0.5p ,
effort to the labor market and none to farming and if * * (
23 Equation (10) thus becomes
However, given the alternative labor market, the principal must optimize expected utility with the constraint because otherwise the tenant would a ≤ 0 i shirk by allocating effort to the labor market for extra income. Thus, equation (17) applies only if a i is nonpositive; otherwise, the optimal choice is . 24 If and the landowner is risk neutral, then the principal's * * a p 0 a p 0 i i expected utility in equation (8) reduces to for
which first-order conditions reduce to
Thus, all crop-share contracts follow 50 : 50 sharing regardless of agentspecific productivity, risk preferences, risk aversion, or reservation utility and regardless of the risk characteristics of the landowner's land. To see when is likely, note that equation (17) suggests a non- * a p 0 i negative a i if wages in the shadow labor market are relatively high ( is p i large). In particular, the a i suggested by equation (17) is at least zero if . Whenever the a i suggested is nonnegative, the optimal choice
for a i is . Note, however, that the agent will only accept such a contract * a p 0 i if because otherwise the labor market is more attractive to
the agent. Thus, if wages in the labor market are too high relative to the return on effort in farming, then no agents are willing to farm. Considering equilibrium adjustments whereby farming returns will increase as land is taken out of production, returns to farming represented by p i must then adjust upward to at least the point where, for all land remaining in farming,
, and thus . Thus, the case with relatively high wages in the labor * p a p 0 i i market and risk-neutral landowners tends to the case where the optimal cropshare contract offered by a risk-neutral landowner is the 50 : 50 sharing arrangement in equation (18).
The Risk-Neutral Landowner with Costs of Information
Another possibility is that the landowner may not know all prospective tenants' agent-specific productivities, risks, risk aversions, and reservation utilities, particularly when the number of (prospective) tenants associated with a given landowner is large, as in developing country agriculture. To reduce information demands and information collection and processing costs, one possibility is for the landowner to consider a limited maximization of expected utility. For example, suppose that the principal simply restricts the types of contracts offered to the two common arrangements observed empirically: either a cash rent or crop-share contract. Or alterna- * * * *
tively, suppose that the principal simply forgoes the opportunity to optimize expected utility with respect to a i by omitting it from the model, as might be the case where the cost of collecting information on all prospective tenants' reservation utilities is excessive. If the principal is risk neutral (the case where sharing is optimal generally), then the principal's expected utility in equation (8) reduces to both in the latter case and in the former case
when crop sharing is chosen. Thus, first-order conditions reduce to equation (18) . This result implies that the optimal crop-share contract for all agents is the same 50 : 50 crop-share contract regardless of their agent-specific productivity, risk preferences, risk aversion, or reservation utility. With this approach, the major problem of collecting and processing full information about prospective tenants and administering contracts accordingly is completely eliminated. Thus, if this information cost exceeds the benefits possible from using full information for individual contract optimization, then the contract in equation (18) 
Thus, as the landowner's land is divided among more tenants, the risk premium tends to zero, and accordingly the optimal share tends to the same result as in equation (18). This result corresponds with the case in developing countries where tenants rent very small plots and each landowner has many plots. While this result is developed for the simple case with identical characteristics, the same principle of spreading risk clearly applies when agents' characteristics vary within reasonable bounds. That is, the risk premium will vanish as given land holdings are divided among more tenants, in which case optimal sharing in rental contracts tends to equation (18) regardless of plot size. Again, in this case, the major problem of collecting and processing full information about prospective tenants and administering contracts accordingly is completely eliminated. Thus, 50 : 50 crop shares are optimal if this information cost exceeds the benefits from its use for individual contract optimization, regardless of the assumption that .
Tenant Competition with Agent Immobility
Another possibility is to treat reservation utilities as endogenous in the case where tenants do not have an alternative labor market, which may be the case in some remote villages in developing countries. Then competition among tenants for agricultural land can result in bidding down the guarantee component of rental contracts. Because the landowner's profit is strictly decreasing in a i in equation (8), this effect of competition, which increases a i toward zero, is favorable to the landowner. However, the landowner would not offer contracts with because tenants could then shirk and yet collect the a 1 0 i guarantee, leaving the landowner with a negative profit. Thus, with sufficient numbers of prospective tenants (sufficient competition), the effects of competition are bounded at , in which case either a risk-neutral landowner * a p 0 i or many tenants contracting with a single landowner tends toward a contract with 50 : 50 landlord-tenant sharing as in the previous two cases.
Conclusions
Comprehensive explanations of common empirical results (stylized facts) have eluded theoretical studies of land tenancy. In this article, we have applied modern agency theory to explain land tenancy contracts in developing and developed countries. We do not assume that effort can be monitored or that contracts are enforceable by courts. Thus, we relax assumptions prevalent in the agricultural contracting literature that are inconsistent with observed practices whereby most land tenancy contracts are informal and oral. We have shown how heterogeneity of characteristics among principals (riskiness of landowners' land and landowner risk aversion) and agents (tenants' productivities, risk premiums, and reservation utilities) can affect optimal tenancy contracts. While equations (12)- (14) suggest that the optimal tenant's share should generally vary across tenants and landowners because of these sources of heterogeneity, the results of this article present a variety of explanations for why the empirical evidence shows a predominance of either cash rent or cropshare contracts, that is, no fixed component of compensation when crop shares are selected. The results tend to explain why crop-share contracts dominate in developing agriculture where landowners are believed to be less risk averse than tenants and can spread risk over many tenants. They explain why cash rental contracts tend to be observed in developed country agriculture where landowners are likely more risk averse and tenants are less risk averse, but yet crop-share contracts may be observed in cases where landowners tend to be risk neutral. The results also explain why cash rental contracts are becoming more common in North American agriculture, where credit and insurance markets have improved, tenants have become wealthier, and landowners have become older and likely more conservative.
The results also provide a variety of explanations for why 50 : 50 sharing is widely observed under crop-share contracts in spite of tenant and landowner heterogeneity. Thus, the principal-agent model of this article provides a potential explanation for the half-century-old puzzle about why share tenancy rates in a wide range of circumstances tend to be one-half (Otsuka et al. 1992 (Otsuka et al. , p. 1969 . One important explanation lies in the transactions cost of collecting, processing, and administering contracts with agent-specific information. But other explanations have to do with equilibrium effects of alternative labor markets, or the lack thereof.
While the analysis of this article shows that a principal-agent model can explain the major stylized facts about land tenancy that have often eluded theoretical studies, a variety of generalizations are needed. First, the model needs to be generalized to consider separate choices for both the sharing of output and the sharing of cash input expenses. Both Allen and Lueck (2002) and Duffy et al. (2003) find that share tenancy contracts for U.S. field crops share current expenses as well as output. Many of these crops place heavy demands on soil nutrients and, in the Great Plains and the West, on irrigation water.
Second, landowners frequently care about more than the immediate income they receive from their land. Land quality can be degraded by tenant management decisions that cause excessive exhaustion of soil nutrients, soil erosion, or depletion of soil moisture, all of which reduce future productivity of land. Soule, Tegene, and Wiebe (2000) show that, other things equal, U.S. farmers who lease for cash are less likely to adopt conservation tillage practices than crop-share farmers (or owner-operators). Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) and Dixit (2002) have introduced models for structuring optimal contracts with multitasking that can represent additional interests of the landowner. Adding these features to the model of this article will likely show that an agent will degrade long-term productivity for short-term gains if the incentive rate is too high. Thus, given the trade-off between short-and long-term objectives, the best interest of the landowner is more likely served by a modest rather than strong incentive for current effort. In other words, the principal will be less likely to choose a cash rental payment than a sharing contract for two reasons. First, the short-term incentive to overuse the land is reduced. Second, if the landowner participates in production decisions by sharing current fertilizer and irrigation expenses, then current production can be better balanced with future productivity. Third, multitasking is also related to issues raised by Gibbons (1998) about designing share contracts with a simple quantifiable payoff. Because contracts are frequently for two or more types of actions that differ in the degree to which their output can be measured, making incentives too strong on an easy-to-measure action and de-emphasizing or ignoring other actions will lead to poor contracts and outcomes for the principal. When contracts are renewable and multitasking is important, Gibbons (1998) and MacLeod (2003) have shown that subjective evaluations are frequently better than objective ones, and weak incentives frequently produce better results than strong but imperfectly specified incentives. These insights on informal contracting can be used to sharpen understanding of the advantages of crop-share contracts and the informal nature of land tenancy contracts.
Fourth, the results of this article assume that the principal does not have hidden actions that affect the agent's payoffs and that the tenant has sufficient wealth to make cash rental payments even in bad crop years. If, for example, the principal is leasing land of unknown quality to a tenant and the tenant cannot observe land quality before leasing it, then an optimal contract may tend more toward risk sharing, even though this tendency is mitigated by contract renewability.
Fifth, with cash rent, output risk may not be transferred completely from the principal to the agent as modeled here unless the payment is made at the beginning of the season. In Iowa, for example, relatively few contracts require full payment of cash rent at the beginning of the contract year (Duffy et al. 2003) . Frequently, contracts require part of the cash rent payment before midyear, and sometimes the size of the second payment is renegotiated (Allen and Lueck 2002) . When cash payments are due during or at the end of the crop year, output risk is incompletely shifted to the tenant because default and renegotiation are possible. Under these conditions, the asset holdings and reputation of the tenant become more important to the landowner than otherwise. In developed countries, prospective tenants are more likely to have sufficient wealth and access to credit and insurance so that contract performance is more likely (Newberry and Stiglitz 1979; Braverman and Stiglitz 1982; Laffont and Matoussi 1995) . But this may be another explanation for why cash contracts tend to be observed in developed rather than developing agriculture.
agents when loyalty is valued by the principal. While their model does not focus on human capital creation, application of Becker's (1975) notions in their framework suggests that landowners will prefer repeated contracting with agents who learn better how to farm their particular tract of land as experience is accumulated.
9. Studies by Ackerberg and Botticini (2002) and Serfes (2003) also assume heterogeneity of principals and agents with respect to risk-sharing attitudes but, in contrast to this article, do so primarily with a focus on implications for endogenous matching.
10. If, e.g., tenants' ability matters, then Allen and Lueck's (1999) regression results would suffer from omitted variable bias. This omission, combined with a representation of tenants' risk preferences that is proxied by tenant wealth and age, could invalidate their finding that risk preferences have no significant effect on land tenure contracts.
11. Under the Household Responsibility System in China, which has been in place for almost 2 decades, farmland is largely owned by the local community and allocated by a community council. Some of this land is distributed to farmers according to need, while the rest is rented by farmers from the community council (see Chen, Huffman, and Rozelle 2003) .
12. While Allen and Lueck (1999) develop some empirical evidence to justify the assumption of risk neutrality, the evidence is based on showing a lack of dependence of tenancy contract terms on wealth. However, risk aversion does not depend on wealth under constant absolute risk aversion. Furthermore, the dependence on wealth under decreasing absolute risk aversion may be too weak to discern empirically even though risk aversion is important.
13. Deininger and Feder (2001) also provide a transactions cost perspective for land asset and rental markets.
14. See Dixit (2002) and MacLeod (2003) for analyses of implicit contracts that require subjective evaluations and are thus necessarily informal.
15. In other words, d may include a landowner-specific shock as well as a general random shock common across all principals. While we do not pursue the matter here, Hueth and Ligon (2001) have shown that demand-induced market prices can generate, in effect, a type of relative performance evaluation that rewards high production in periods where others' production is low because of supply shocks.
16. The constant 0.5 is arbitrary but simplifies algebra and allows the model to be defined in terms of absolute risk aversion.
17. Assuming that the contract is not accepted unless the certainty equivalent expected utility is infinitesimally larger than the reservation utility does not appreciably alter the results.
18. One reason that tenants in developed agriculture may make risk-neutral land tenancy decisions is the abundance of commodity futures markets for the crops grown there. For example, under certain assumptions, the separation result shows that farmers in the presence of futures markets optimally behave with risk neutrality in commodity production decisions, even though they behave with risk aversion in futures market transactions (Danthine 1978; Holthausen 1979; Feder, Just, and Schmitz 1980) . While this result has been developed for the case of price risk, the shocks in eq. (1) represent either output or revenue. A similar argument is also made by Allen and Lueck (2002) with respect to capital and insurance markets.
19. In the agency literature, this type of contract corresponds with principals selling franchises to risk-neutral agents (Prendergast 2002) .
20. There remains an end-game problem, i.e., as contracting parties near the end of their relationship, each has less incentive to avoid reneging because future reputation is less important (Holmstrom 1979; Milgrom and Roberts 1992, p. 260) . In these situations, formal contracting becomes more important.
21. While a more formal competitive equilibrium with finite numbers of pro-spective tenants by attribute combination could be developed using concepts such as marginal tenant characteristics, the forthcoming intuition does not extend appreciably beyond the restrictive case considered here. 22. While the model in this article has been developed with identical one-unit tract sizes for all tenants, this result is evident, e.g., by comparing the principal's risk premium between the cases of n tenants with one unit of land each versus one tenant with n units of land. In the case of n identical tenants with independent agent-specific production shocks, eq. (8) becomes the agent-specific variance is multiplied by compared with the case with one tenant, 2 1/n which after aggregating across n tenants leaves the risk premium divided by n compared with the single tenant case. Another way to see this result is by comparison of eqq. (12) and (13) because j i 2 and j d 2 receive equal weighting in eq. (12) where , whereas n p 1 the weighting of j i 2 is less than that of j d 2 by a factor of n in eq. (13).
